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Law, Forms o f Governm ent and Liberty in  
Montesquieu’s Thought
It is difficult to imagine a work more famous and admired by its contempo­
raries, one which had a more significant impact on the eighteenth century 
political thought than Montesquieu’s The Spirit o f the Laws. The book, first 
published in 1748, became instantly a classic, comparable to the greatest 
works o f the ancients, a required reading not only for political thinkers and 
statesmen, but also for the educated public in general. The Spirit seemed as 
if  it had realized one of the basic aims o f the Enlightenment: it was to be 
“the science of government” whose level o f certitude equaled that o f natural 
sciences. At last the society and its institutions could be studied with the 
same exactness as stars. The enlightened circles were thrilled and universally 
applauded Montesquieus work. They treated him as a political sage and “an 
oracle” in political theory and practice. The framers o f the American Con­
stitution, who first put into practice his idea on the division o f powers, had 
really terrible time with another tenet o f his teaching, namely that republican 
government is suitable only for small, city-like polities. In the opinion of the 
Framers Montesquieu could not have been mistaken, and yet the nascent 
American Union was not a city-state.
Was Montesquieus fame justified? Did he really elevate political theory to 
a new, substantially higher stage? What was his real message? In other words, 
did he really deserve to be put on the pedestal? And what remains o f his te­
aching, now, about 250 years after his death.
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Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689-1755) was born at La Brede, in the 
vine-growing region of Bordeaux o f southwestern France.1 His true family 
name was de Secondat. On his mother side, he descended from the nobility 
o f the robe, i.e., from those who had gained noble status due to the service in 
state administration. In 1708 he graduated from the University o f Bordeaux 
with the degree in law and, subsequently, he continued his legal education in 
Paris. He returned to his family estates in 1713 and, soon afterwards (1716), 
he inherited from his childless uncle the estates and title o f Baron de La Brede 
et de Montesquieu. As o f that time he habitually used the name Baron de 
Montesquieu.
His uncle passed on to him something else in addition to the title and 
estate — his high office in the parlement o f Bordeaux (the highest judicial 
and administrative body in the province). As the closest relative, the younger 
Montesquieu had the right to purchase the office as the first buyer and for 
a substantially smaller fee than any other candidate, provided that he was qu­
alified. And Montesquieu was qualified as a lawyer. France was the fatherland 
of venality o f offices, and his case shows well how this worked in practice.
In subsequent years, Montesquieu quietly pursued his legal career in Bor­
deaux but at the same time he developed scholarly interest in matters ranging 
from social to natural phenomena. As a member of the Academy o f Borde­
aux, he wrote papers on a wide variety o f topics. A fundamental change in his 
life came with the publication o f his novel, titled Persian Letters (1721). The 
novel became a success while his author a celebrity in the Parisian salons. As 
a result Montesquieu spent more time in the capital than in Bordeaux, and fi­
nally, after selling his office, he moved to Paris altogether. A provincial lawyer 
turned into a philosophe o f fame, therefore he had to live as such.
Between 1728 and 1731 he traveled extensively throughout Europe, visi­
ting Austria, Hungary, Italy, Germany, the Netherland, and finally England 
where he lived for two years and joined Freemasonry. Upon his return to 
France, he moved back to his estates, because failing eyesight no longer al­
lowed him to shine in Paris. In spite o f the disease he continued writing on 
various topics, the most prominent o f which was Roman ancient history. 
Increasingly however, he was focusing on what would become his opus ma­
gnum, The Spirit o f the Laws (Esprit des Lois). In time his sight deteriorated 
so much that Montesquieu was forced to dictate his thoughts rather than
1 This brief biographical sketch is mainly based on D. W. Carritherss Introduction, [in:] Mon­
tesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, ed. D. W! Carrithers, Berkeley 1977, p. 3-88; I. Berlin, Against 
the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas, Princeton 2001, p. 132-133; D. Boucher, E Kelly, 
Myślicielepolityczni. Od Sokratesa do współczesności, Kraków 2008, p. 290-296.
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write them. He completed the book nearly seventeen years later in 1748.2 As 
mentioned, it became an instant success, being on the Index librorum prohibi- 
torum (1751), notwithstanding. Montesquieu died in 1755 in Paris, suffering 
from a sudden attack o f fever.
The admiration that The Spirit o f the Laws (SL) aroused in the past and conti­
nues to arouse in the present is somewhat puzzling.3 It is a lengthy work, with 
over a thousand pages, that hardly anyone is able to digest in its entirety.4 Its 
structure is also not helpful — six parts subdivided into thirty-one books with 
no apparent guiding principle. This can confuse any reader, as it did Voltaire 
who had complained about it. Furthermore, the book is filled with incon­
sistencies and outright contradictions that are typical for any work written 
over a period of many years.5 However, perhaps it was d’Alembert who was 
right by claiming that obscurity in Montesquieu’s work was premeditated: 
“What would be obscure for vulgar readers is not for those whom the author 
has had in view [...]. Having to present [...] important truths, the [...] direct 
statement o f which would have been able to injure without advantage, [...] 
Montesquieu has had the prudence to envelop them; and, by this innocent 
artifice, has hidden them from those to whom they would be harmful, witho­
ut their being lost for the wise.”6
If we are to put d’Alembert suggestion aside, and judge The Spirit o f the 
Laws for what they are, we are incline to think that the book owes initial suc­
cess to its allegedly scientific nature and to its educational usefulness. For the
2 Carrithers states that in feet Montesquieu began his work over The Sprit o f Laws in 1734, thus
he would devote thirteen years, not seventeen, as most of his biographers claim {Introduc­
tion..., p. 13).
3 For a brief summary of Montesquieu’s impact on his contemporaries and the future generation,
see: D. L. Williams, Political Ontology and Institutional Design in Montesquieu and Rousseau, 
“American Journal of Political Science” 2010, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 526. Isaiah Berlin is alitde less 
enthusiastic {Againstthe Current..., p. 130-132).
4 A relatively recent article by a Scottish university professor M. P. Masterson opens with a story
of a good student paper on Montesquieu that nearly convinced his professor to read The Spirit 
of the Laws {Montesquieus Grand Design: The Political Sociology of Esprit des Lois, “British 
Journal of Political Science” 1972, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 283).
5 This had been already noticed by Montesquieu’s contemporaries. Cf. for example D. Lowen-
thal, Book I  o f Montesquieus The Spirit o f the Laws, “American Political Science Review” 1959, 
Vol. 53, No. 2, p. 485-486; or more recent: A. J. Samuel, The Design o f Montesquieus The 
Spirit of the Laws: The Triumph of Freedom over Determinism, “American Political Science 
Review” 2009, Vol. 103, No. 2, p. 305-306.
6 D’Alemberts eulogy of Montesquieu quoted by D. Lowenthal, Book I  o f Montesquieu..., 
p. 486, 498.
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purpose o f The Spirit was two-fold: first and utmost, scholarly and, second, 
pedagogical. That second aim is usually overlooked, outshined by the first, 
yet Montesquieu does not hide that he includes it among his goals. In the 
Preface he writes: “It is not a matter o f indifference, that the minds o f the pe­
ople be enlightened. The prejudices o f the magistrate have arisen from natio­
nal prejudice. In a time of ignorance they have committed even the greatest 
evils without the least scruple.” He then goes on, expressing hope that he 
succeeds in persuading “those who command, to increase their knowledge,” 
and that he contributes in general to making “mankind recover from their 
prejudices.”7 In this he is like other enlightened French thinkers whose first 
thought was to combat and ridicule the old order, and second to win over the 
rulers and the elites. One should not lose sight o f this when analyzing The 
Spirit. As in many other works o f the Enlightenment, behind the detached 
style and alleged objectivity lie a burning desire to destroy the old and to 
build a new world.
If pedagogic and propaganda were important for our philosophe, his 
“scientific” purposes figure at the forefront. As John Hallowell, the author o f 
an American classic on history of liberal thought, observed, Montesquieu was 
“born in an age that was captivated by the success o f Newtonian physics.”8 
Mysteries o f the universe seemed finally dispelled; heaven is not just a matter 
in motion, as previous thinkers claimed (Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes), but 
obeys the law o f gravitation. How incomplex and how convincing! Now, if 
one only discovered a law of politics and society, parallel to that o f gravity, 
how simple and reformable would human world become. And Montesquieu 
seemed to have achieved it.
Book I presents his teaching on law that extends to every corner o f the 
universe, from natural order to human affairs. “Laws [...] are the necessary 
relations derived from the nature o f things. In this sense all beings have their 
laws, the Deity has his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences 
superior to man have their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws.” On the 
surface this concept is not far from St. Thomas’s eternal, natural and human 
laws. They also extend from stars to men. The similarity is even more striking 
if  we keep in mind that Montesquieu connects law with reason, not will.9 Yet
7 Montesquieu, The Spirit o f Laws, ed. byD. W. Carrithers, Berkeley 1977, Preface, p. 10, 12-13,
hereafter referred to as SL. References from the SL include book number (Roman numerals), 
followed by chapter number and then paragraph number.
8 J. H. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modem Political Thought, Lanham 1984, p. 141. Cf. The
Oxford Illustrated History o f Western Philosophy, ed. A. Kenny, Oxford 1997, p. 328.
9 SL, book i, chap. 1:1 and chap 1:11. Montesquieu links law with human rather than divine
reason.
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these similarities are deceptive. St. Thomas’s law originates in God, resides 
in His reason and governs all being for their own good, while Montesquieu’s 
law is a “blind fatality” that extends from “the Deity” to all things, even if  he 
denies its fatalist nature.10 The Deity itself seems under the power o f law. It is 
active but through invariable laws, not miracles. By implication, the first and 
greatest miracle — creation — could also be a result o f blind necessity, dictated 
by law.11
Laws “are a fixt and invariable relation” continues Montesquieu. In fact, 
they are so fixed and so constant, that in material nature “each diversity is 
uniformity, each change is constancy.”12 Natural world acts perfectly accor­
ding to these laws. Exceptions concern intelligent beings, who although are 
also under invariable laws, yet they do not “conform to them so exactly as the 
physical world” (italics KL). The reason for it is that we are finite creatures, 
“liable to error” and endowed with free will.13 If we were not partially exempt 
from invariable laws, then all laws relating humanity would have been the 
same. In subsequent books he also adds geography, climate, soil, etc to justify 
differences in human law.
Montesquieu downplays terms like state o f nature and law of nature both 
so prominent in Hobbes’s and Locke’s thought. In his copious book he only 
briefly describes the conditions before the establishment o f society. He en­
dows individuals with some sense o f primordial justice. They exchange bene­
fits and injuries, in other words, they are kind toward those who are kind and 
retaliate if attacked.14 We can deduce that this is a part o f our nature belon­
ging to the category of “invariable laws” which we can hardly challenge. Fur­
thermore, before founding civil society, individuals feel weak and timid, and 
fear each others. Their fear, however, does not lead them to war, as Hobbes 
wanted, but to peace, because they feel, first o f all, inferior, not equal. Living 
in peace in pre-societal conditions makes, according to Montesquieu, the 
first law of nature. The need of nourishment is the second natural law, while 
attraction we feel for each other, in main part derived from sex, is the third 
law.15 The three first laws of nature, resulting from sentiment — as stresses an 
American specialist in Montesquieu’s thought David Lowenthal -  lead to
10 Cf. SL i, chap. 1:2 and chap. 1:6. Hallowell reads it as the law of cause and effects that rules in 
the universe (Main Currents..., p. 142). See also: D. Lowenthal, Montesquieu, [in:] L. Strauss, 
J. Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., Chicago 1987, p. 514.
11 D. Lowenthal, Book I  o f Montesquieu..., p. 487.
12 SL i, chap. 1:7.
13 SLi, chap. 1:10 and 14.
14 SL i, chap. 1:9.
15 SL i, chap. 2:2, 3, 7. See also SL i, chap. 1:12.
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the forth, resulting from reason. Individuals endowed with reason, however 
brute and primitive in original state, gradually acquire knowledge, and this 
animates in them “the desire o f living in society.”16 Yet, as soon as they found 
society, “they lose the sense o f their weakness, the equality ceases, and then 
commences the state o f war.”17
Montesquieus concept o f state of nature and its laws beg a few comments. 
It is first o f all an odd vision. Only by implication we can deduce that state 
o f nature provides conditions o f liberty and equality. Principles so prominent 
in other similar concepts, for some reason, are only implied, not stated. Self- 
-preservation is similarly downplayed.18 The exchange of benefits and injuries 
seems to serve only as a means to avoid Hobbesian homo homini lupus prin­
ciple, because this would open a state o f war and, indirectly, justify arbitrary 
power. At the same time, benefit-injury exchanges do not lead individuals 
to kindness and charity towards each other, probably to avoid Lockes per­
spective on state o f nature. Nourishment is placed in the category of law of 
nature, while it fits more to “invariable laws,” where he puts benefit-injury 
exchanges. And, finally, the establishment o f society immediately brings state 
o f war, which, in fact implies that war existed even in state o f nature. Monte­
squieu’s inconsistencies are thus truly striking, particularly that they occurred 
in one of his “foundation” chapters, one which serves him as the cornerstone 
for his theory.
The state o f war that ends the state o f nature and coincides with the emer­
gence of society, is not explained but just mentioned. It seems the notion of 
state o f war serves Montesquieu only as a pretext to move to the topic o f hu­
man law that according to him arises from war. Human law consists o f “the 
law o f nations,” laws on political regime and the civil law. The first category, 
the law of nations, regulates the relations between “a variety o f nations” that 
inhabit “so great planet.”19 War is a means to conquest which in turn aims at 
preservation, and the law of nations is to regulate this process. Each nation 
sets rules relating to it, thus the law o f nations seems to differ in each case.20 
The second category of law is “a politic law.” It regulates the relations betwe­
en “the governors and the governed.” Since “no society can subsist without 
a [...] government,” each must have such a law. Dismissing authority o f a few,
16 SL i, chap. 2:8; D. Lowenthal, Book I  o f Montesquieu..., p. 492.
17 SL i, chap. 3:1.
18 SL i, chap. 1:13. „They have not our hopes, but they are without our fears [...]; even most of 
them are more attentive than we to self-preservation, and do not make so bad a use of their 
passions.”
19 SL i, chap. 3:3.
20 SL i, chap. 3:3, 5.
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Montesquieu claims flatly that government is either o f a rule o f one or o f 
many.21 Finally, the third category — the civil law — concerns “communication 
of citizens among themselves.” As individual will is insufficient to enforce its 
wishes in relations to others, civil law expresses a common will, i.e., “a con­
junction of all their wills.”22
At the end of chapter three o f book I Montesquieu finally touches that 
which has become a mark o f his work, the spirit o f laws. Four paragraphs ear­
lier he states that law “is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inha­
bitants o f the earth.” Strangely overlooking the law of nations, he continues 
that the political and civil laws o f each nation are “only the particular cases in 
which this human reason is applied.”23 Their diversity originates in a peculiar 
“humor and disposition” o f each nation, the mode of its government and 
institutions.24 And then comes a famous paragraph that makes geography, 
climate, soil, weather as well as the character o f human habitat (sedentary or 
nomadic; engaging in husbandry, hunting or agriculture) responsible for the 
spirit o f laws. That spirit also depends on liberty, religion, commerce, wealth 
and manners o f the people. Only taken together all these features shape “the 
Spirit o f Laws” of a particular nation.25
Lord Acton sarcastically suggested that the idea o f explaining laws — and 
by extension, political regime -  “by the barometer and the latitude” was to 
make Montesquieus praise o f England “less injurious to French patriotism.” 
More seriously, he claimed that it served the thinker as a means to reconcile 
himself with monarchy in France, however odious it was in his time.26 Lo- 
wenthal suggests far more serious motivations. According to him, Montesqu­
ieu rejects the quest o f ancient and medieval thinkers for the best theoretical 
as well practical regime. There is no such thing as the best order. All depends 
on particular conditions. Ultimately, this leads to relativism, even if on the 
surface this concept opposes subjectivity and appears in a flair o f objecti­
vism.27
21 SL i, chap. 3:3, 7, 8. Montesquieu seems to disagree with Aristode by treadng a union of sev­
eral families as a polity, not village. He also has a vague remark about paternal authority that 
sounds like an echo of Lockes view on this topic (SL i, chap. 3:8).
22 SL i, chap. 3:3, 10.
23 SL i, chap. 3:11.
24 SL i, chap. 3:12-13; cf. 9.
25 SL i, chap. 3:14—15. In book XIX, chap. 4:1 Montesquieu was briefer but straighter to the 
point: “Man are influenced by various causes, by the climate, the religion, the laws, the max­
ims of government; by precedents, morals and customs, from whence is formed a general spirit 
that takes its rise from these.”
26 J. E. E. D. Acton, Lectures on the French Revolution, ed. N. Figgis, R. V. Laurence, London 
1910, p. 7.
27 D. Lowenthal, Montesquieu..., p. 516.
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***
In subsequent books o f The Sprit (between II through X), Montesquieu com­
pares various forms of government. Yet, he does not engage himself merely in 
comparative politics. He attempts to do far more: he searches for the nature 
and principle o f each government, i.e., for hidden springs that move it. Since 
in parallel, he also analyzes peoples and their natures, he attempts not only 
at erecting a scientific political philosophy but also political sociology (or 
sociology of politics) and political psychology.28 Furthermore, in line with 
Enlightenments penchant for geometry and pedantry, he claims that his te­
aching is universal, applicable to any society and any political regime anytime 
in history. Quite possibly, however, this claim is only to distract “the vulgar 
reader,” not to instruct the wise, for in fact his observations concern mainly 
France o f his time, supplemented by customary Greek and Roman examples, 
and few others.
According to Montesquieu, “there are three species o f government; “repu­
blican, monarchical and despotic.”29 Lets review each of them, one by one, 
i.e., without following Montesquieus confusing order.
R epublic 
D e m o c r a c y
Republican government is when the people or part o f it is the sovereign. This 
constitutes its nature. A republic becomes democracy if all people are the so­
vereign in some respects and the subject in others. Since not all people know 
how to govern, especially how to prepare legislation and direct foreign affairs, 
they select a council or senate. The people have no difficulty whom to chose 
for office because they know each other. However, a customary method of 
choosing the senators, court members and lower magistrates is not an elec­
tion — which leads to envy — but a selection by lot. Only military comman­
ders and higher magistrates are elected. Offices and participation in popular 
assembly are not paid, probably to exclude, or at least make harder for the 
poor to hold office. Montesquieu points to Rome and Athens as examples o f 
a republican regime, but in fact he copies mainly of Solon’s rules on limited 
democracy.30
28 Cf. The Oxford Illustrated History..., p. 328; M. P. Masterson, Montesquieus Grand Design..., 
p. 283-284; G. H. Sabine, A History o f Political Theory, 4th ed., Hinsdale 1973, p. 507.
29 SLii, 1,1.
30 SL ii, chap. 2.
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The principle (Montesquieu likens it to the mainspring of a watch) o f de­
mocracy is virtue, especially love o f the republic, equality, frugality, courage 
and sacrifice o f private interest for the public good.31 Unlike in monarchy 
and despotism in which law or force substitute for virtue, democracy cannot 
survive without virtuous people, especially if they hold office. Without virtue 
democracy is a short-lived, terrible regime torn by partisanship and corrup­
tion. Citizens behave like fugitive slaves, frugality is a vice and pleasure passes 
for liberty.32 Thus is why education aimed at cultivating virtues is all impor­
tant in a republican form of government, much more than in any other form 
of authority. Additionally, the senate is in charge of public mores playing the 
role o f a censor. Paternal and marital authority also ought to be strong to 
maintain morality.33
Montesquieu underlines that democracy requires equality but must avoid 
extreme equality. Extreme equality does not tolerate any authority and di­
stinction, even the most natural such as parental and marital. It is therefore 
self-destructive and cannot subsist. Although we are born equal in the state of 
nature, we cannot continue it in society and some inequality seems natural.34
A r i s t o c r a c y
Aristocracy is also a republican form of government. It arises when sovereign 
power rests only in some part o f the people — the nobility — while the rest o f 
the people is regarded as subjects. If aristocracy is numerous, it forms a no­
ble democracy and needs a senate to prepare others for a decision making 
process. Aristocracy holds elections, not a selection by lot to chose the go­
vernment. The best aristocracy is that which only has a small number of pe­
ople who do not share power. Consequently “the more aristocracy borders on 
democracy, the near it approaches perfection: and, in proportion as it draw 
towards monarchy, the more is it imperfect.” In this context Montesquieu 
also adds the remark that aristocracy in Poland is the most imperfect because 
it enslaves the peasants.35
The virtue o f aristocracy is moderation, for the nobles ought to restrain 
themselves from oppressing the people and from seeking preeminence among 
themselves. Still, however moderate, aristocratic government displays a vigor
31 SL iii, chap. 3:1; v, chap. 2-6; cf. iii, chap. 5:2. For Montesquieu’s use of the term principle, 
see M. E Masterson, Montesquieus Grand Design..., p. 286.
32 SL iii, chap. 3. Cf. vii, chap. 2:1.
33 SL iv, chap. 5; v, chap. 7:10; chap. 19:14-15.
34 SL viii, chap. 2-3, chap. 4:1.
35 SL ii, chap. 2:18 and chap. 3.
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unknown to democracy. In a direct contradiction to Aristode, Montesquieu 
claims that since equality is removed from aristocracy, virtues are not as com­
mon in it as in democracy (he also does not see a distinction between aristo­
cracy and oligarchy). Consequently, laws must substitute for virtues, and en­
force moderation. The principal sources o f disorder in aristocracy is excessive 
inequality among the nobles, and between the nobles and the people. While 
largess is pernicious to democracy, it is beneficial in aristocracy. In the former, 
wealth makes the people forget virtue (citizenship), in the latter, it gives the 
people some sense o f citizenship.36 Corruption o f aristocracy occurs when the 
power of the nobles are arbitrary, in particular if it is hereditary. To maintain 
moderation, aristocracy should have law against luxury.37
Republics both democratic and aristocratic are beyond rescue once they 
fall into corruption and spoil their virtues.38 Republican regime is also appro­
priate for “a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist.” It ends either 
in loss o f liberty or disintegration.39 It was these passages that gave awful he­
adaches to the framers o f the American Constitutions. However, his further 
remarks on confederate republics perhaps served them as an inspiration to 
move from a confederation to a federation.
M onarchy
The nature o f government is monarchical if  one person is the sovereign and 
governs “by fixt and established laws.” Since all power originates in the ruler, 
there must be “intermediate, subordinate and dependent powers” through 
which authority acts. The nobility is “the most natural intermediate and sub­
ordinate” body, in fact, so natural that there can be no monarch without no­
bility and no nobility without monarch. As Montesquieu stresses, monarchy 
would slip into despotism without it. The clergy plays a similar role — a sta­
tement striking for a freemason. Montesquieu also puts emphases on the role 
o f “a depositary power” in monarchy. Such a body would promulgate new 
laws or revive old ones. Although he does not say it openly, he in fact points 
to the existing institutions in pre-revolutionary France -  parlements — that 
played exactly this role, and in doing so, turned into the last line o f defense 
against royal despotism.40
36 SL iii, chap.4; v, chap. 8.
37 SL vii, chap. 3; viii, chap. 5; vii, chap. 2:1.
38 SL viii, chap. 12:2.
39 SL viii, chap 16:1; chap. 20.
40 SL ii, chap. 2:1-2 and chap. 4. Cf. Lord Acton, The History of Freedom in Antiquity, [in:] Se­
lected Writings of Lord Acton, ed. J. R. Fears, 3 vols., Indianapolis 1985-1988, p. 1:7.
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In monarchy the state can subsist independent o f virtues; laws substitute 
for them. Furthermore, the royal court is full o f the most corrupted and 
dishonorable men. Still honor is the virtue o f monarchy. Monarchy requires 
“preeminences, ranks, and [...] noble descent,” as well as some luxury becau­
se, as said before, without the nobility and other intermediate bodies it would 
lapse into despotism.41 Ambition, which is a vice in a republic, serves well in 
monarchy, because “honor sets all the parts o f the body politic in motion.” 
In a statement strikingly resembling Adam Smith’s later remark about “the 
indivisible hand,” Montesquieu says that in kings service “each individual 
advanced the public good, while he only thinks o f promoting his own parti­
cular interest.”42
Monarchy requires good education of the privileged elite. Good manners, 
politeness and virtues, especially o f honor are particularly appreciated. In 
general, education in monarchy “tend to raise and ennoble the mind,” conse­
quently such a mind does not need censorship, as it has “the whole universe 
for a censor.”43
Monarchy has a great advantage over a republic because o f its unity o f 
power. But since too hasty decisions could be damaging, laws and legal ma­
gistrates should show slow the process down. Monarchy enjoys even greater 
advantages over despotism -  the state is more fixed and steady, and avoid 
excess, and caprice typical for despotic authority.44 Monarchy is best suitable 
for medium sized states.45
D espotism
The government has despotic nature if one ruler directs “everything by his 
own will and caprice.” In such a regime rulers will usually substitute for law 
— laws are few and can be changed at any moment. Since this makes rulers 
“lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant” they often appoint a vizier who rule in their 
names, while they themselves surrender to “the most brutal passions, pursu­
ing, in the middle o f a prostituted court, the most capricious extravagancies.” 
Corruption is the “very nature” o f that government. Montesquieu illustrates 
this regime by examples from the Near East and far east Asia.46
41 SL iii, chap. 5:2-3, 8-9; chap. 6, chap. 7:1. Also laws should support the nobility, helping it to 
become hereditary (SL v, chap. 9:1-3. On luxury cf. vii, chap. 4:2.
42 SL iii, chap. 7:3.
43 SL iv, chap. 2; chap. 3:1; v, chap. 19:17.
44 SL v, chap. 9; v, chap. 11.
45 SL viii, chap. 17; 20.
46 SL ii, chap. 2:1-2 and chap. 5; v, chap. 14:1; viii, chap. 10.
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Despotism has no virtue as its principle. Honor for example is unknown 
at all in this order. Republican virtues would be dangerous for the regime. 
Instead fear is its principle, while tranquility is it end. That tranquility is not 
peace but silence in face o f invading enemy. It is particularly useful among 
the great, for otherwise they would oppress the masses. Power in despotism 
depends on ruler’s caprice who can raise and destroy even the greatest o f his 
servants. There is, however, one limitation of his power: religion. Although 
his subjects are ready to “abandon a parent, nay they will kill him if the prince 
so commands,” yet, he cannot order them to drink wine. “The laws of reli­
gion are o f a superior nature.”47
Education in this form of government seems superfluous. Learning and 
knowledge are dangerous. Excessive obedience that is required presupposes 
ignorance. The people under despotism are thus timid, ignorant and spiri­
tless. Yet, if is a fitting regime for a large empires.48
***
Montesquieu so far has not mentioned a form o f government whose princi­
ple is liberty. This changes in the celebrated book XI that focuses on political 
liberty in general and on England in particular.
Political liberty is understood in many ways, Montesquieu reminds us. For 
some it is the right to depose a tyrannical authority; to others it is the power 
to elect their ruler; still to others it is the right to bear arms, etc. People usually 
apply the term freedom to their preferred form of government, to monarchies if 
they are monarchists, or republics, if they are republicans. In democracy, which 
more than any other government allows the people to do what they please, 
liberty is confounded with the power of the people.49 His own definition is that 
liberty does not mean unregulated freedom. In society living under law, liberty 
is “the power of doing what we ought to will,” and of “not being constrained to 
do what we ought not to will.” In the next sentence he does not elaborate on 
what we ought or not ought to will, i.e, on moral issues. He skips it probably 
because he takes Judeo-Christian morality for granted, i.e., he treats it as self- 
-evident. Instead he offers a concise but disappointing definition that “liberty is 
a right o f doing whatever the laws permit.50
47 SL iii, chap. 8-9; v, chap. 14:12.
48 SL iv, chap. 3; viii, chap. 20.
49 SL xi, chap. 2.
50 SL ix, chap. 3. Cf. D. Spitz, Some Animadversions on Montesquieus Theory of Freedom, “Ethics” 
1953, Vol. 63, No. 3, part 1, p. 207-213.
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Montesquieus next observation is that republics are not free by nature. 
Political liberty depends on moderate government rather than its form, thus 
moderate monarchy can also secure liberty. Further, since “every man inve­
sted with power is apt to abuse it,” liberty depends on checking one power 
by another.51 And finally, listing different ends o f government (dominion for 
Rome, religion for the Jews, war for Sparta, individual freedom for Poland), 
he points out to one nation in the world who has political liberty as the direct 
end o f its constitution -  England.52
On the basis o f the English fundamental law, Montesquieu generalizes: “In 
every government there are three sorts o f power: the legislative; the executive in 
respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard 
to things that depend on the civil laws.” The then elaborates that legislative 
authority is the power of making laws, the first executive authority covers fore­
ign affairs and domestic security, while the second executive is in fact judicial 
because it settles disputes between individuals and punishes crime.53 Finally he 
adds that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers.”54 In this clumsy way Montesquieu completes 
his concept o f the division of powers, which he mistakenly believed was already 
in place in England (at that time England had not yet separated the executive 
from the judicial branch leaving both in kings hands).
Subsequendy, Montesquieu specifies that the executive power should be­
long to the king because the government o f one is more efficient than of 
many. He should enjoy a veto power over the acts o f legislature, for otherwi­
se, the latter “might arrogate to itself what [ever] authority it pleased.”55 Legi­
slative branch cannot meet too rarely, on the other hand, there is no need to 
debate continuously. As it has no will when is not assembled, it the executive 
branch which calls it into session. Two chamber legislature is better than one 
chamber because in the first case two chambers are a check on each other.56 
The judicial power is an awesome power, therefore it must not be “annexed 
to any particular state or profession.” That is why Montesquieu postulates the 
trial by jury of peers that judges in “manners prescribed by law.”57 Finally, the
51 SL ix, chap. 4.
52 SL ix, chap. 5. By the English constitution we naturally understand not one document but 
a serious of laws and statutes that goes back to the Magna Carta and form fundamental law of 
England. Reference to Poland is negative because he ends he claims individual liberty lead to 
oppression of the whole by the means of liberum veto.
53 SLxi, chap. 6:1-2.
54 SL xi, chap. 6:5.
55 SL ix, chap. 6:36, 42, 52.
56 SL ix, chap. 6: 38-41, 55.
57 SL ix, chap. 6:13-15.
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three branches must be separated and independent from each other and so 
equal in power as to be a check on each other.58
In the next book Montesquieu focuses on liberty and laws in relations to 
individuals. He mentions four categories o f crimes: against religion, morals, 
public tranquility and security o f subjects. In general, he postulate prudence 
and mild punishments, and refuses to treat as crimes anything that is said or 
written. Specifically, religious sacrilege should be left to God to avenge rather 
than punish by law.59 Although he does not use terms such as freedom of 
speech and publication, he in fact demands it.60 His strong condemnation of 
slavery adds to his liberal credentials.61
Montesquieu’s title to greatness rests not on his alleged elevation of politi­
cal theory to the level o f “science o f government,” but on his discovery of 
the division of powers, and the need for balancing one power by another. 
Although political thinkers knew from antiquity that undivided authority 
degenerates, the division that they commonly had in mind was that o f 
the ruling principle: either o f the rule o f one, or o f a few or o f the many. 
Since Plato and Aristotle, balanced government meant mixing monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy. Montesquieu proposed a different principle o f 
division, i.e., o f power itself and that proposition quickly became a canon 
o f liberal politics.
If the idea o f division o f power became instantly a success in political 
theory and practice, one cannot ascribe to Montesquieu all the merit for its 
triumph. First, Locke made the original step on this road by dividing power 
between the executive (including judicial) and legislative powers. Second, 
Montesquieu probably thought that England already had the full division 
of powers and that he merely described it, not uncover a new principle. And 
third, the American Framers were bold enough to implement his theory in
58 In book ix, chapter 6, Montesquieu mentions several times these principles.
59 SL xii, chap. 4:2-12; chap. 5; chap. 12.
60 SLxii, chap. 12:1-2.
61 SL x, chap. 3:8; cf. xv, xvi entirely devoted to the issue of slavery. The remaining books of The 
Sprit have scattered remarks on specific issues, which today can be treated as a curiosity rather 
than anything creative in political though. For the order’s sake, let me list their topics. Book 
xiii is on taxation; books xiv-xviii are on effect of climate and soil on the nature of government 
and industry, including that on slavery; book xix is on morals and customs; books xx—xxii 
includes observations on commerce and money; book xxiii is on population; books xxiv-xxvi 
are on religion and various laws; books xxvii-xxxi include loose remarks on the history of Ro­
man and feudal laws.
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practice. The success o f the US Constitution, based not only on the division 
of powers, but also on federalism and on classical forma mixta, contributed 
to Montesquieus fame as well.
With Montesquieu’s theory of the division and balancing government as 
well as the demand for freedom of speech and print, coupled by the support 
for representative government and the opposition to slavery, liberal theory 
was nearly complete. That is also his ticket to greatness. However, one can­
not overlook his odd claims of universality, serious weaknesses o f his theory 
as well as curious structure, and unbearably verbose character o f The Sprit. 
Book I on laws is particularly weak. Broad generalizations and the deification 
of law, perhaps fitting for his epoch, are really strange today. His idea o f the 
state o f nature and law o f nature is undeveloped and sketchy, if compared to 
Locke’s. Finally, his teaching on forms o f government that was to compete 
and replace Aristotle’s classical division is simply not a rival: in this, he is sim­
ply not in the same league as Aristotle. Still, this is liberal thought at its best.
Abstrakt
Praw o, form y władzy i w olność w m yśli M onteskiusza
O duchu praw Monteskiusza przyniosło autorowi sławę, czyniąc z niego politycznego 
mędrca okresu oświecenia, nieomal wyrocznię w kwestiach myśli politycznej. Artykuł 
dokonuje krótkiego przeglądu tego dzieła Monteskiusza, próbując znaleźć inne powody 
do jego chwały, poza samym trójpodziałem władz. Rezultat tego przeglądu, skupionego 
zwłaszcza na naturze prawa, formach władzy oraz kwestii wolności, jest w dużej mierze 
negatywny. Choć Monteskiusz wzbogacił myśl liberalną o nowe idee, daleko mu do 
klasyków myśli politycznej starożytności.
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